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I 
INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to the governance of human affairs, people love to build 
grand theories, only to find out that they do not work in practice.1 But what of 
ideas—or call them intuitions—that make perfect sense in practice but for 
which it seems impossible to develop a theory? This, we believe, is the problem 
with the appealing idea that when humans come to govern themselves at 
various scales of aggregation, from the village to the global, they should always 
attempt to remain at the lowest scale possible—that self-government is at its 
best on a smaller scale. And yet, people must solve their problems together, 
across borders and across levels of governance. And so, in practice we 
adjudicate between these two imperatives. But how do we make sense of the 
balancing act in theory? This symposium issue does so through systematic 
exploration of the analytical and normative dimensions of the principle of 
subsidiarity across time and issue areas. The introduction acknowledges that 
subsidiarity comes in many shapes and forms: it is at best a political reminder 
against excessive centralization, what the editors call “a rebuttable presumption 
for the local”2—rebuttable if good reasons exist for shifting authority upward. 
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 1.  Some of the ideas discussed in this article were developed in the context of the Programme on 
Global Trade Ethics, University of Oxford, co-directed by Emily Jones and Kalypso Nicolaïdis. An 
early version of the ideas expressed in this article is provided by Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
Towards a Global Trade Ethics: Preliminary Building Blocks, in BUILDING BLOCKS TOWARDS A 
GLOBAL TRADE ETHICS: A COMPENDIUM OF THE OXFORD PROGRAMME ON GLOBAL TRADE 
ETHICS 6, 6–14 (Matthew Eagleton-Pierce, Emily Jones & Kalypso Nicolaïdis eds., 2009) [hereinafter 
Howse & Nicolaïdis, Towards a Global Trade Ethics]; see also Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
Democracy without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics, in THE SHIFTING 
ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY 
AND SUBSIDIARITY 163, 163–91 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008) [hereinafter Howse & 
Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty]. 
 2.  Markus Jachtenfuchs & Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1, 6.   
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So if we are to theorize from practice, we must ask both what these “good 
reasons” are and when the centralizing rationale should trump the presumption 
for the local. 
In this article, we explain our move from subsidiarity to what we call “global 
trade ethics,” how it relates to a more general political ethics for the global, and 
how it can be better anchored in the spirit of global subsidiarity. “Global trade 
ethics” refers to a set of ethical, rather than legal, principles that ought to 
inspire the various actors involved in addressing conflicts in the realm of trade. 
In effect, this terminology seeks to shift the debate over subsidiarity from a 
negative constraint to a positive ethos. 
We begin with the widely shared diagnosis of the crisis of multilateral trade 
governance and the challenge posed by those who argue that in today’s world, 
power is too diffused, among too many actors, and with too many divergent 
agendas to make multilateral economic governance workable.3 Even short of 
predicting its demise, questions abound over what matters should still be 
negotiated at the World Trade Organization (WTO), how to negotiate them, 
and what kind of outcomes would be acceptable.4 Further questions arise about 
the wider context in which global trade governance is nested: the possible 
displacement of regional over multilateral approaches, the links between trade 
and finance, the role of the Global South in the new balance of power, and the 
impact of technological change, including the Internet. We therefore need to 
ask anew what it means for a quasi-universal organization like the WTO to 
search for sufficient common ground for addressing this range of questions. 
Our aim here is to offer a blueprint for meeting this challenge, through the 
idea of devising a sort of code of conduct under the heading of “global trade 
ethics.” We do not seek to establish nor defend a hierarchical structure of 
values.5 Nor do we provide a foundation for liberal democratic theory beyond 
the state or suggest that any of the elements drawn upon are somehow beyond 
contestation.6 Moreover, we do not argue that our ethics can determine or fully 
justify any particular set of substantive trade rules or policies. Rather, on the 
theoretical front, we proceed through a kind of “inductive normative” approach 
whereby we seek to relate actual and emerging normative practices in the 
multilateral trading system to conceptions of legitimate governance that are 
 
 3.  See John S. Odell, How Should the WTO Launch and Negotiate a Future Round? (European 
University Institute Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme, 
Working Paper No. 110, 2014); see also Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: 
Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 8 INT’L NEGOTIATION 79, 79–109 (2003); Thomas W. 
Hertel, Bernard M. Hoekman & Will Martin, Developing Countries and a New Round of WTO 
Negotiations, 17 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 113, 113–40 (2002). 
 4.  See generally CHRIS BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT LAW, 
AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT (2014).   
 5.  See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 5–6 (2009).  
 6.  See generally CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY (2013); 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Democratic Theory and Europe’s Institutional Architecture, in THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES IN TIMES OF CRISIS 
(Simona Piattoni ed., 2015).  
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widely shared in liberal democratic theory.7 And in practice, we imagine our 
ethics as contributing to shape the deliberative space in which alternative rules 
and policies are debated and negotiated. 
This article proceeds, in part II, by discussing some of the material and 
ideational contexts relevant to our discussion. Part III suggests eight principles, 
which together can provide the building blocks of a global trade ethics faithful 
to the spirit of global subsidiarity. Part IV concludes. 
II 
WHY? THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL ETHICS OF TRADE GOVERNANCE 
A. From Subsidiarity to Global Ethics 
To start, it may be useful to explain why we have chosen to engage with the 
subsidiarity puzzle under the heading of “global trade ethics.” The question 
brings us back to the mid-1990s, when we found fascinating the ways in which 
both the European Union (EU) and the United States struggled with the 
contested nature of allocation decisions between different levels of governance. 
Struck by the lack of bridges between these parallel political debates, we 
brought them together in a volume pairing scholars of both polities.8 In the end, 
our initially narrow focus on “comparative subsidiarity” gave way to what we 
called The Federal Vision, a vision freed from the specific variant of federal 
statehood, proceeding instead from the notion that multiple levels of 
governance have been and remain a normal and ideal mode of governing 
human affairs across time and space.9 In short, federal unions do not necessarily 
require the kind of centralizing of core powers that we find in federal states. 
And even in federal states these are often shared to some extent between the 
national government and the sub-units.10 
Like the editors of this issue, the comparative enquiry led us to draw lessons 
from the federal to the global level of governance. In the 1990s, the WTO was 
the object of a type of subsidiarity debate under the guise of increasingly strong 
calls for its constitutionalization—a move aimed at exempting global trade rules 
from the rough and tumble of interstate politics.11 We sought to counter these 
arguments by drawing inspiration from the EU experience while stressing its  
 
 
 7.  See Kalypso Nicolaïdis, European Democracy and Its Crisis, 51 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 351, 
351–69 (2013). 
 8.  See generally KALYPSO NICOLAÏDIS & ROBERT HOWSE, THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY 
AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or 
Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE (SPECIAL ISSUE) 73, 86 (2003); see also Robert Howse & 
Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why a Constitution for the WTO is a Step Too 
Far?, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE 
MILLENNIUM 227, 227–52 (Roger Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
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idiosyncratic features, calling for a kind global subsidiarity from which the EU 
had largely exempted itself.12 
One might consider the WTO a hard case for voicing concerns about 
subsidiarity breaches. It is inclusive in terms of membership and its decisions 
are based on consensus, constituting a prima facie safeguard against 
centralization by stealth. But this simply implies that the scope of subsidiarity 
will depend heavily on the terms under which power has been delegated 
upward and on what constrains the exercise of this power.13 And within this 
scope, we heed the introductory article’s assertion that subsidiarity should apply 
especially firmly in areas such as trade, in which one cannot identify weighty, 
justice-based reasons for scaling up decisionmaking.14 
Yet as we continued to pursue our twin interrogation regarding the federal 
(or regional) and the global over the last decade, we became increasingly 
frustrated with the dominant institutional focus implied by both the term and 
conceptual apparatus of subsidiarity and grew convinced of the need to free the 
principle from its narrow, mainstream meaning of allocation of power. This led 
us to suggest foundations for what we called a global ethics for trade 
governance—or in short, a “global trade ethics”15—meant to inform decision 
making across the judicial, political, economic and civic realms of 
decisionmaking. 
The starting point for a global trade ethics lies to a great extent in the 
practice itself. A lack of agreement today about formulas for economic 
governance and the diversity of interests for pursuing them either competitively 
or cooperatively is not in and of itself fatal to multilateral trade governance. 
Instead, we can find a kind of common ground emerging more clearly than ever 
before in WTO politics through the refinement of actual or emerging normative 
practices, observed at the WTO’s Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali, and 
elsewhere.16 This ethos—akin to the ethos of democratic pluralism that allows 
people with deep divergences of interest and value to govern themselves in a 
legitimate fashion within a liberal democratic polity—must be forged at the 
global level, where the divergences in question are greater.17 If it is not to be a 
renewed project of hegemony, this ethos must be more open-ended and 
respectful of political autonomy than the grandiose forms of constitutionalism 
that some scholars have sought to project onto multilateral trade governance, 
especially during times of greater optimism about its prospects. 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  See Jachtenfuchs & Krish, supra note 2, at 25.   
 14.  Id. at 16. 
 15.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Towards a Global Trade Ethics, supra note 1. 
 16.  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 3–6 December 2013, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(13)/DEC (2013).  
 17.  See Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 185. 
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B. The Rise and Contestation of Disembedded Liberalism 
A starting point for optimism about the possibility of common ground in the 
form of global trade ethics is that, despite of the global financial and economic 
crisis, there has been no dramatic or durable resurgence of protectionism and 
“beggar thy neighbor” spirals (although exchange-rate battles can be seen as a 
more subdued modern equivalent), nor a wholesale tendency to abandon the 
rules or lose confidence in them.  Indeed, the WTO’s dispute settlement system 
is relatively strong and many of its existing rules enjoy substantial legitimacy, 
providing a basic framework for nondiscriminatory most-favored-nation (MFN) 
trading relations.18 Thus, we do not share the pessimistic assessment that the 
partial and protracted failure of the Doha Round undermines the important 
acquis of the WTO, which, in many respects, is built on the “embedded 
liberalism” of the post-war General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).19 
Nevertheless, this failure has revealed a considerable dissensus over the 
future of the WTO and the kind of reform needed to sustain the global trade 
system whose roots need to be revisited. In an earlier period, the GATT and 
later the WTO operated according to a self-contained logic, as a relatively 
closed regime based on a “horse trading” or reciprocal model of trade 
negotiations. Most important was finding bargains that could leave all states 
relatively better off, based upon their revealed preferences or domestic political 
economy.  In a world where trade negotiations were mostly about reducing 
tariffs and similar border measures, such an approach seemed logical. But even 
in this earlier era, some understanding was needed regarding the legitimate 
parameters and content of WTO rulemaking. It was embedded liberalism that, 
shared among the small group of countries leading WTO negotiations, or 
rather, their “enlightened” political elites, provided this understanding: 
multilateral trade liberalization was to be premised on the maximum domestic 
policy space compatible with the principle of nondiscriminatory market access. 
When determinations regarding such liberalization were difficult, 
unemployment or consumer protection trumped openness. 
This consensus withered away in the era of “disembedded liberalism” of the 
last two decades.  The Uruguay Round in the early 1990s and its aftermath 
undermined the consensus in a number of important ways.20 In a negotiation 
among an increasingly large and diverse group of states, some insisted on 
bringing rules into the WTO that were premised in part on neoliberal views of 
 
 18.  Chad P. Bown, Trade Policy under the GATT/WTO: Empirical Evidence of the Equal 
Treatment Rule, 37 CANADIAN J. ECON. 678, 679 (2004).   
 19.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 7, 1957, 278 U.N.T.S. 170 [hereinafter GATT]; 
see John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 398 (1982). See generally MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, 
ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (4th ed. 
2013) (addressing developments in the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body of the WTO). 
 20.  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. 
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proper economic governance rules;21 for example, on subsidies, intellectual 
property, and services.22 The struggles were intense between these states and 
others—often, developing nations—which regarded this departure from 
embedded liberalism as illegitimate. The resulting “deal” did not represent a 
resolution of these disagreements, but rather represented a resignation in the 
case of some developing states, who viewed neoliberalism as being imposed on 
them nonetheless, through the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund; and in the case of other states, an acceptance that even if the rules in 
question were illegitimate, the gains or advantages in other areas outweighed 
these considerations.23 These constrained deals were clearly very fragile 
substitutes for legitimacy because the compensating gains turned out to be 
fewer and more transitory than what was expected or promised, whereas the 
new, constraining rules were set in stone. 
The two failed attempts to launch a new trade round on economic 
governance rules at Seattle and Cancún reflected the resurgence of 
disagreement about both ends and means within the WTO, with the critique of 
the Uruguay Round’s result given new resonance by emerging doubts about 
neoliberal globalization. The Doha Declaration,24 which was meant to launch a 
new multilateral trade round committed to development through trade, was 
little more than an agreement to disagree on the underlying issues, 
manufactured through post-9/11 anxiety about the future of global (dis)order. 
Faced with the prospect of a definitive death of the Doha Development 
Agenda, negotiators at the 2013 WTO Bali Conference managed to put 
together an interim, or transitional, agreement on a handful of issues.25 This 
represented sufficient progress to allow for a continuation of the Doha Round. 
For some, the modest or tentative nature of this deal, along with its near 
unravelling due to India’s concerns over the adequacy of the interim food-
security arrangement, reflected the marginal relevance of the WTO as a site of 
global economic governance, especially when contrasted with the ambition and 
scope of the megaregional negotiations. Not surprisingly, Roberto Azevedo, the 
WTO’s Director-General, put a more positive spin on matters, announcing the 
WTO was back in business.26 But what can “business as usual” mean for the 
multilateral trade regime today, given that it is underpinned neither by 
embedded liberalism—the political philosophy that enlightened post-war 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See generally William Drake & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: 
“Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT’L ORG. 37 (1992). 
 23.  See Silvia Ostry, The Uruguay Round North-South Grand Bargain: Implications for Future 
Trade Negotiations, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 285, 285–300 
(Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002). 
 24.  World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 25. See generally Sofía Alicia Baliño, Bali and the Future of Multilateral Trade, 8 BIORES 1 (2014) 
(providing background information on the Conference). 
 26.  Roberto Azevedo, Director-General, World Trade Org., Remarks at the Meeting of the 
General Council (Nov. 27, 2011). 
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political elites used in creating the GATT—nor by neoliberalism—embodied in 
the Washington Consensus–based normative outlook that propelled the WTO 
into existence in the early 1990s? 
C. From Institutions to Ethics 
The challenge facing a global trading system in search of legitimacy is to 
reembed liberalism within domestic circumstances while doing so in an era of 
much greater interdependence and demands for transnational justice than after 
WWII. In today’s era, increasing heterogeneity and intrusiveness of global trade 
rules raise concerns from the local not simply because of parochial self-interest 
in protectionism but because these rules can challenge norms viewed by citizens 
as reflecting paramount concerns ranging from health to privacy to financial 
soundness. If embedded liberalism was an early expression of subsidiarity, the 
constitutionalization of neoliberalism became its denial. What then would it 
mean to seek the reembedding of trade governance within the variety of 
circumstances present at the national and local levels? These circumstances 
include justice or injustice that pertain to non-Western actors who perceive not 
only a Western bias in the existing rules of the game,27 but also an antiregulatory 
bias, still incipient in many countries around the world, that might threaten a 
state’s certain core functions.28 Thus, to again infuse subsidiarity into the WTO, 
it is necessary to consider the problems raised not only by disruptive import 
competition, but also by the various kinds of indirect harm that may occur 
through the establishment of an economic structure with benefits for some and 
severe costs for others. 
Much thinking on how to reform the global trading system centers on 
questions of formal institutional architecture—about the ways in which the 
different decisional bodies can be adapted to better reflect economic power 
shifts in the international system, while still mitigating power asymmetries. 
Reform must be about finding ways for state and non-state actors to be better 
represented in order to more effectively impact rulemaking. Indeed, institutions 
and institutional rules play a crucial role in international cooperation. In 
subsidiarity terms, it matters who decides how to formally allocate authority to 
global institutions. 
But institutions cannot be changed so radically as to truly address the 
difficult challenges faced by the WTO. In this sense, formal institutional 
tinkering cannot help much in dealing with the spillage of globalization. If 
multilateral, regional, or bilateral trade relations are to evolve through 
governance that touches on a wide range of policy areas and human interests, it 
is not enough to believe that the rules of the game can simply be jurisdictionally 
 
 27.  See Elwyn Grainger-Jones & Carlos A. Primo Braga, The Multilateral Trading System:  Mid-
Flight Turbulence or Systems Failure?, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE 
ISSUES 27, 27–37 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006).  
 28.   DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX 77 (1997).  
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circumscribed, contained, or designed and policed by some institution in an ex 
ante manner. Institutional rules are certainly critical, but they are not the whole 
picture. Absent a broader vision, it is difficult to see how WTO members would 
agree on precisely which institutional changes are desirable in the first place. 
In this context, legitimacy is likely to come as much from behavior as from 
structure. This insight may appear counterintuitive given the frequent 
association of democracy with formal structures of representation. But as 
illiberal and even liberal democracies demonstrate, the legitimating function of 
representation, when closely examined, depends on the adhesion of its agents to 
certain normative commitments. Such adhesion seems even more central when 
considered in relation to governance beyond the state, where legitimacy lacks 
the prop of direct representation. Legitimacy, then, partly depends on the 
extent to which the agents of governance conduct themselves—and are seen to 
conduct themselves—in accordance with a political ethics of global governance 
informed by norms such as inclusiveness, mutual respect, transparency, value 
pluralism, procedural justice, rational deliberation, and respect for a role for 
passionate commitments in global politics. 
A strong version of global subsidiarity means that the transnational 
management of social conflict is more likely to be legitimate if addressed by the 
appropriate people, in the appropriate space of governance, in the appropriate 
ways. In turn, this implies the need to ensure respect for local circumstances, 
values, and preferences while at the same time stressing the limits of such 
respect when local circumstances fail to demonstrate the basic ingredients of the 
kind of compatibility necessary for engaging in common governance. 
This argument fits with a statist or pluralist version of cosmopolitanism, 
which seeks to identify political structures that may serve global norms of 
political and distributive justice and argues that mere reliance on inclusive 
membership of international institutions to serve these norms is insufficient.29 It 
is impossible to consider which institutions are appropriate without considering 
which rights or right processes these institutions must serve. Indeed, 
“Institutions on their own are not guaranteed to produce benign policies . . . 
what is needed are certain political cultures and certain character traits as 
well.”30 
Political structures are critical, but they nevertheless can be conceptualized 
as shells, generally conducive to such democratic ethos.31 The spirit of global 
subsidiarity, at least as understood in its broadest sense, should not only serve 
as a guiding principle regarding appropriate allocations of competencies, but  
 
 29.  See generally NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF 
POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010); KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD 
OF STRANGERS (2006). See also SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL 
THEORY 148–88 (2005).  
 30.  CANEY, supra note 29, at 172. 
 31.  See DAVID CAMPBELL, NATIONAL DECONSTRUCTION: VIOLENCE, IDENTITY, AND JUSTICE 
IN BOSNIA 196–200 (1998).  
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also appropriate respective roles, behaviors, and relationships in complex 
multicentric political systems. 
Trade rules develop, according to different logics and involving different 
actors, in three spheres: insider network “governance,” in which legitimacy is 
based on the assumption of technical expertise and instrumental rationality with 
a fixed “telos” of trade liberalization; formal adjudication, in which legitimacy is 
based on transnational rule of law and the assumed impartiality of judges; and 
democratized governance, for which legitimacy is based on the assumed 
representativeness of government bargains.32 If trade rules increasingly involve 
the balancing of values and the interests of various interstate and intrastate 
constituencies, legitimacy will not fully come from the kind of technical judicial 
expertise that has hitherto dominated the field. Technical expertise does not 
confer legitimacy in adjudicating between values, and it often makes biased 
assumptions that power ought to be delegated up simply because it is somehow 
deemed efficient to do so.33 The transformation of insider network 
“governance” by political ethics is unlikely to be rapid or easy. Eventually, the 
network must either open itself up to this political ethics or simply continue to 
lose out to other mechanisms of governance in the competition for legitimacy. 
And while this political ethics is already visible to some extent in formal 
adjudication, it is more often exemplified in the breach. 
It is perhaps hardest to assess the forces that affect the third sphere of 
democratized governance. Under what conditions will enough politicians 
consider that, in spite of efficiency gains and the benefits of free trade, there are 
good reasons to privilege lower levels of decision? These reasons may be 
framed in terms of individual liberty, justice, democracy, self-determination, 
political accountability, or respect for social and cultural diversity. It might be 
the case, as the introduction suggests, that states with disproportionate power, 
and thus a greater stake in a regime they have shaped, will resist demands for 
subsidiarity. But should one not consider more systematically the many 
variations that exist around these issues: the ways in which countries are divided 
over the need to resist centralization, the clashing positions of their 
governments and legislatures, or the potential variance in national positions 
over time? Due to these variations, actors might make calculations that 
encompass considerations beyond the expected difficulty of change itself, erring 
against centralizing because of expectations that it would be difficult to scale 
down should circumstances change. 
As the introduction suggests, however, focusing on democratic processes 
alone is not sufficient.34 Rather, it is critical to ask whether democratized 
governance can mitigate the effect of asymmetries of power in the system 
without denying the constraints of power distribution or the progressive 
 
 32.  See Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 174. 
 33.  See Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral 
Trading System, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 94–117 (2002). 
 34.  Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 25–26.  
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potentials associated with ethical uses of power. In this equation, internal 
democratic checks on the use of asymmetric trade power can be harnessed in 
addition to external institutional safeguards.35 Moreover, questions remain 
about the scope of the democratic polity and whether democracies that 
cooperate, bounded by subsidiarity concerns, are equipped to internalize 
externalities that may be borne by noncitizens or future generations. A political 
ethics beyond the state cannot simply pit democratic peoples against other 
democratic peoples. 
One way to think about this kind of political ethics is to hope for more 
democrats, if not democracy, beyond the state. Legitimacy is not grounded in 
people’s beliefs in the abstract, nor in permanent referenda and “global opinion 
polls,” but in the degree to which power relations can be justified in terms of 
people’s beliefs, values, and expectations. The justifications for these power 
relations are grounded in the behavior of the relevant actors and in the beliefs, 
values, and expectations that inspire them—as well as in the congruence with 
other levels of governance. As a result, we must focus less on the setting and 
more on the performances of the actors and their ethos, or political culture. 
This involves a series of connected shifts of emphasis: from institutions to 
outcomes, from structure to behavior, from substantive constraints on states to 
those of process, from specific rules to general norms, and perhaps from 
architectural to biological metaphors. 
The need to imagine a global ethic for the modern age leads back to 
democracy and the unavoidable need to think beyond majoritarianism at the 
global level, while eschewing pure unanimity logics. In subsidiarity terms, 
questions arise about the trade-off between the transfer of competence and the 
exercise of voice at the global level, not only in terms of institutional rules but 
also in terms of legitimacy. The functional equivalent to such a middle ground is 
found by investigating political philosophy. At least since Rousseau, the essence 
of democratic self-determination has been the notion that only laws of a 
nation’s own making can legitimately coerce citizens.36 This follows from the 
core democratic idea of political equality: the reflection in politics of each 
individual’s equal moral value. Democracy requires moving beyond consensus, 
or at least formal consensus in the shadow of power asymmetries (an 
institutional constraint). So what makes it legitimate for those who disagree—
the dissenting minority, the losers with respect to a particular outcome—to 
nevertheless be subject to the outcome and to even be legitimately coerced by 
the laws and policies in question? What kinds of norms and practices permit 
persons who disagree with or lose from particular outcomes nevertheless to 
view the outcomes in question as consistent with the political ideal of self-
legislation or nonsubordination? And—to the extent that perceived benefits 
 
 35.  Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Trusting the Poles? Mark 2: Towards a Regulatory Peace Theory, in 
REGULATING TRADE IN SERVICES IN THE EU AND THE WTO: TRUST, DISTRUST AND ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 263, 263–64 (Ioannis Lianos & Okeoghene Odudu eds., 2012).   
 36.  See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762). 
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change over time—what kinds of norms and practices are most likely to sustain 
the commitment of those who decide to implement and enforce them even 
while they may come to benefit others, including non-nationals, more? 
Understanding the spirit of this undertaking requires both caveats and 
explanations. First, the objective is not to derive prescriptions for multilateral 
trade governance from abstract propositions or principles of moral or political 
philosophy, in the manner of, for instance, Thomas Pogge.37 The ethos is already 
visible in many of its elements in what one might call the ideal self-
understandings of actors in the system. It can be seen in deliberations about 
global economic governance that occur at many levels, from town hall debates 
to national parliaments, and even to global sites of deliberation and 
contestation, including Davos and alternate locations.38 Nevertheless, although a 
serious commitment to global trade ethics does not involve a wholesale 
delegitimization or rejection of existing institutions as fundamentally unethical, 
this ethics does have long-term transformative implications and is far from an 
attempt to put the best face on the status quo or to adorn it with a high-minded 
moralism. 
When applying a global ethics to trade governance, it is crucial that the 
ethics enables outcomes to be seen as legitimate even where disagreement 
persists so that some actors see themselves as losers regarding a specific 
outcome. Many debates about the direction of the WTO are paralyzed by zero-
sum views of the relationship between internal and external legitimacy,39 but 
multilateral trade governance depends on both the allegiance of the actors that 
make it work on a daily basis and the broader constituencies or stakeholders 
whose lives and livelihoods are at stake. The “experts” in the rooms and the 
protestors in the streets seek equilibrium between internal and external 
legitimacy—an equilibrium which is inherently dynamic. Recall Machiavelli’s 
sketch of what is required for a healthy republic in his Discourses: a balance 
between the demands or requirements of the “great” on the one hand and the 
“people” on the other.40 
III 
HOW? OPERATIONALIZING A GLOBAL TRADE ETHICS 
How then can policymakers operationalize the concerns stated above and 
concretely address the questions of legitimate coercion and sustainable 
 
 37. See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989); see also Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, 
Global Justice, Poverty, and the International Economic Order, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 437, 437–39 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds., 2010).  
 38.  The WTO has scored some successes at global forums, such as judicial dispute settlement or 
the tentative accords at Bali. 
 39.  Joseph Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflection on WTO Dispute 
Settlement, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE 
MILLENIUM 334, 341 (Roger Porter et al. eds., 2001).  
 40.  See generally NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES ON LIVY: LIBERTY AND CONFLICT 
(Julia Conaway Bondella and Pete Bondanella trans., 2003) (1517).  
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governance in the WTO context? A starting point is to facilitate self-
consciousness of the ethical underpinnings of a range of specific practices 
among multilateral trading system actors. This could generate conversation that 
inspires an unwritten, or perhaps even explicit, code of conduct for the system. 
This code might be analogous in its guiding and common ground-building role 
to the earlier ethos of embedded liberalism previously discussed. The following 
eight principles provide a basis for such a catalyzing conversation. They pertain 
in effect to the two sides of subsidiarity: on one hand, autonomy—the 
rebuttable presumption for the local—and on the other hand, the forms and 
boundary that characterize this presumption at the global level. As stated 
above, these principles are not intended to build a hierarchical structure and, 
furthermore, there might well be tensions or trade-offs among them. The same 
is true among constitutional values in liberal democratic states. Finally, the 
principles are not exhaustive: they are meant as the beginning point of a 
conversation, not an end. 
A. Inclusiveness: Participation and Internalization41 
Outcomes that result from the exclusion per se of the interests and values of 
individuals or groups from the decision-making process are likely to be 
inconsistent with the democratic ideal of political equality.42 In the WTO 
context, such exclusion has often been justified by a formal conception of the 
allocation of authority between the WTO and other international organizations, 
or between the WTO and domestic polities.43 In the former case, interests and 
values affected, or even jeopardized, by trade liberalization have often been 
excluded by the “insider” community on the grounds that some other 
international organization is responsible for those concerns.44 At the same time, 
it has often been argued that social interests affected by trade liberalization 
should seek voice through their own domestic government.45 This article has 
indicated why domestic politics may not be an adequate guarantee of 
inclusiveness. 
Inclusiveness need not, however, entail the challenge of participation of 
every relevant group or its representatives in the various kinds of 
decisionmaking made at the WTO. In a number of WTO Appellate Body (AB) 
decisions, such as the EC–Hormones46 and EC–Hormones Suspension47 cases, 
 
 41.  For previous discussion on this topic, from which much of this article’s substance is drawn, see 
Howse & Nicolaïdis, Towards a Global Trade Ethics, supra note 1. 
 42.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 186. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WTO Docs. WT/DS26/AB/R; WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Jan. 16, 1998).  
 47.  Appellate Body Report, Canada—Continued Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS321/AB/R (adopted Oct. 16, 2008).  
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and more recently, the U.S. Shrimp–Turtle48 and EC–Asbestos cases,49 the AB 
has displayed this spirit of inclusiveness by showing awareness of the range, 
balance, and importance of the human values at stake beyond trade 
liberalization.50 The most recent example is the EU–Seal Products case,51 where 
the AB accepted that moral beliefs about the treatment of animals could be an 
acceptable justification for restricting trade. Although the AB has displayed a 
concern for inclusiveness as participation by permitting submission of amicus 
briefs by nongovernmental actors, thereby broadening the voices heard well 
beyond the insider community, these decisions show that inclusiveness need not 
always depend on participation, provided decisionmakers have an ethic of 
inclusiveness in the way they are conscious of the full range of values and 
interests at stake in a given matter. Under an ethic consistent with the ideal of 
political equality, agents—be they judges, politicians, or even activists—do not 
need to privilege those values and interests most characteristic of their own 
epistemic community. 
Without formal mechanisms of participation, or minimal ones (for example, 
the possibility of observer status at WTO Ministerial Conferences), groups 
speaking for a range of values have recently gained the attention of WTO 
delegates and negotiators;52 this has been notable in the case of trade-related 
aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs)53 and the creation of the recent 
WTO instruments protecting access to affordable medicines.54 In the case of 
services, civil society groups have sensitized delegates and negotiators as to how 
particular commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
might affect the ability to ensure essential public services.55 This has been all the 
more remarkable because the delegations in question have often been from 
developing countries, whose governments have been hostile to the direct 
involvement of civil society in the WTO.56 More generally, the creation of the 
Non-Agricultural Market Access-11 and G-20 groups of developing countries 
and their push to be included in all big decisions is slowly changing the face of 
WTO negotiations in part by increasing these countries’ confidence and 
therefore their acceptance of other actors.57 
Increasing transparency of processes within the WTO has furthered 
inclusiveness, not only by the opening up of Panel and AB hearings, which now 
 
 48.  Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. Shrimp–Turtle]. 
 49.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products 
Containing Asbestos, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001).  
 50.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 186. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 187.  
 53.  Id.  
 54.  Id.  
 55.  General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter 
GATS]; see also id.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
12-HOWSE AND NICOLAIDIS INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:13 PM 
272 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:259 
happens routinely when frequent litigants like the United States, the EU, and 
Canada are parties to the dispute, but also through the publication of 
negotiating drafts of texts as a norm, for example, throughout the Doha Round. 
Even during the Bali Ministerial, it was possible to follow and comment on the 
development of proposals through timely publication of material on the WTO 
website. This stands in sharp contrast to the megaregional negotiations—the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Transpacific Partnership, and 
the Trade in Services Agreement—where drafts of legal texts have generally 
been kept secret and where public participation has been seriously 
constrained.58 However, once these agreements are finalized, they may still 
encounter significant difficulties regarding their legitimacy when they face ex 
post legislative scrutiny. The global trend toward democratization, combined 
with generational change, may be influencing the values of those involved in the 
day-to-day governance processes of the WTO. Faizel Ishmael, the South 
African ambassador to the WTO, is exemplary in this regard (but certainly 
alone, as his roots are in the progressive politics of the trade-union movement 
in South Africa).59 In contrast, former Director-General of the WTO Supachai 
Panitchpakdi appointed a task force of elderly “wise” gentlemen—the 
Sutherland Committee—tasked with consulting with no one in their 
deliberations as to the future of the organization.60 The appointment of the 
Sutherland Committee reflects the older elite-authoritarian values of an earlier 
generation of developing country policy elites. 
Inclusiveness also relates to the principle of antifactionalism, which is well 
established in liberal democratic theory. The risk always exists that, in practice, 
democratic institutions will be dominated by a particular faction that 
commandeers policy for its own interests rather than on behalf of all.61 
Antifactionalism entails a very high level of scrutiny of negotiating proposals in 
the WTO that are essentially responsive to the agendas or interests of subsets of 
powerful states, and which cannot properly be conceived of or defended in 
terms of the common good of the global community. Such proposals must not 
dominate, or be seen to dominate, the negotiation agenda at any particular 
time. This does not involve some abstract notion of substantive equality, such as 
that all benefit equally or that the least advantaged benefit disproportionately. 
It simply means that the proposal advances a good capable of being recognized 
as that of the entire community, not simply of a faction within the community. In 
all liberal democracies, there are legitimate policies responsive to the demands 
of particular constituencies; avoiding factionalism is therefore a matter of 
degree. 
 
 58.  Sofia Plagakis, Transparency and Trade Agreements: If the Public Wouldn’t Like it, Don’t Sign 
It, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (2014), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/transparency-and-
trade-agreements-if-public-would-not-like-it-do-not-sign-it. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo 
& Andrew Moravcsik, Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1, 6–7 (2009).  
12-HOWSE AND NICOLAIDIS INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE) 6/13/2016  3:13 PM 
No. 2 2016] TOWARD A GLOBAL ETHICS OF TRADE GOVERNANCE 273 
In the process that led to the outcome at Bali, the norm of inclusiveness was 
clearly at play to a greater extent than in earlier negotiations. This was most 
dramatically illustrated by resistance to the effort of some players to isolate 
India, which was insisting on policy flexibilities for food security under the 
Agreement on Agriculture.62 Through repeated efforts, the WTO Director-
General and key supporters managed to get those most opposed to the 
flexibilities to directly face India’s concerns, rather than threaten India that if it 
did not capitulate, the country would be seen as the destroyer of the Doha 
Round.63 Similarly in the case of trade facilitation, rather than resorting to 
strong-arm tactics, bullying, or the notorious “Green Room” of informal top-
level negotiations, the approach was to continue working even with the 
concerns of the Least-Developed Countries until an approach addressed the 
imperative that commitments be matched to capacities and technical assistance 
to build such capacities where lacking.64 Even more than traditional multilateral 
negotiations, the negotiation over new regional agreements such as the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Transpacific 
Partnership, tend to be characterized by both secrecy and interest groups’ 
selective access to the negotiators. One must ask whether such shortfalls in 
inclusiveness are at least partially remedied by the more-inclusive 
parliamentary and other public consultation processes in some states. 
B. Reversibility: Review and Revision 
In contrast to the Schmittian politics of friend and enemy,65 which gains its 
intensity from the possibility that one side will permanently suppress or 
annihilate the other in political struggle, a democratic political ethic will place a 
high value on opportunities to revisit and revise particular outcomes. This is not 
simply about inclusiveness in its connection to political equality. The possibility 
of review and revision allows “losers” to have confidence that the fact that a 
particular outcome unfavorable to their values or interests does not indicate 
exclusion from or subordination in political life—they live to fight another day.66 
Perhaps this is where the tension between political ethics and the 
constitutionalist vision of the WTO is most visible, as the latter regards the 
acquis of each negotiating round as an irreversible “progression” toward a 
global economic constitution.67 
 
 
 62.  Jayati Ghosh, India Faces Criticism for Blocking a Global Trade Deal, But Is It Justified?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/ 
aug/22/india-criticism-blocking-global-trade-deal. 
 63.  See generally KENT JONES, RECONSTRUCTING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY: AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH (2015). 
 64.  See Antonia Eliason, The Trade Facilitation Agreement: A New Hope for the World Trade 
Organization, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 643, 643 (2015).  
 65.  CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26–27 (1927). 
 66.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 187. 
 67.  Id. at 188. 
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This mind-set has been seen in the attitude of a number of very significant 
developed countries to the meaning of the Doha Round.68 For many developing 
countries, calling the Round a “development round” provides an opportunity to 
revisit and rebalance the Uruguay Round outcome, which is widely regarded as 
unfair to developing countries.69 For the developed countries in question, new, 
pro-development concessions are possible (based more or less on reciprocity, 
although there is some openness to special and differential treatment),70 but 
many countries resist the “open[ing] up” of the Uruguay Round’s main 
treaties.71 Notably, even where review was built into the WTO treaties, such as 
for services liberalization, nonactionable subsidies, and the need for safeguards 
with respect of service, the review processes have been long delayed or 
blocked.72 But such review processes were put into the agreements in part to 
assure “losers” that the matter would be reconsidered at a future point in time, 
in light of experience and changing perceptions.73 The trials and tribulations of 
the Doha Round, and its conclusion on a minimalist and disappointing note, is 
largely due to the betrayal of this spirit of reversibility or at least of revisiting 
agreements in light of changing cost-benefit assessments. 
Here political ethics point to an anti-architecture architecture: a 
consideration of political and legal mechanisms and devices that allow the 
membership collectively but also individually to revisit and rebalance their 
rights and obligations.74 There is trade-off, however, with the value of the WTO 
system as a “rules-based” system; pre-commitment always involves tying 
someone else’s hands, and thus it is problematic from the point of view of 
democratic political equality and political ethics.75 
The WTO Facilitation Agreement76 that resulted from the Bali Ministerial 
Conference charts new territory in the architectural embodiment of 
reversibility. Developing countries in particular are able to set deadlines for 
implementation of obligations that are revisable, without compensation or 
rebalancing concessions, in light of nations’ actual capacities to implement. For 
instance, the interim settlement on food security envisages a comprehensive 
accord and opens up the possibility of revisiting the adequacy of the policy 
space provided by the Agreement on Agriculture. The taboo against revisiting 
the Uruguay Round settlement was broken once again, as it had been the 
 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (discussing the feasibility and desirability of pre-
commitment). 
 76.  Preparatory Committee on Trade Facilitation, Agreement on Trade Facilitation, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/931 (adopted Jan. 15, 2014). 
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access-to-medicines amendments to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights that were made at the beginning of the 
Ministerial Conference. 
C. Control: Checks and Balances 
The political ethics of democracy draw not only on the ideal of participation 
and self-determination qua Rousseau, but also the ideas of classical liberalism 
qua Montesquieu and Madison including the notions of checks and balances 
and separation of powers. Here, eighteenth-century political theorists 
understood a functional separation of powers to depend not just on the actual 
architecture allocating competences, but for every estate of its (limited) 
authority and legitimacy, on each institution’s independent but nonhegemonic 
spirit. Because democracy can degenerate into governance by majority faction, 
checks and balances offset any single institution or faction hegemonizing 
decisionmaking to the exclusion or subordination of other interests and values. 
Recently, the UN human rights institutions have begun to raise issues about 
decisionmaking in the WTO on behalf of constituencies and values traditionally 
excluded or marginalized there.77 This entails a certain spirit of contestation 
between institutions. Often, international lawyers regard tensions between 
institutions and regimes in international law as something negative—
”fragmentation” or “cacophony”—and many architectural proposals seek 
“coherence.”78 “Coherence” reflects checks-and-balance values when it means 
that outcomes should reflect in a balanced way the full range of values and 
interests at stake.79 But often, coherence is understood in the manner discussed 
above, as an attempt at enforcing a kind of “watertight compartments” view of 
competences (for example, the WTO is a trade organization, not a human rights 
organization, which has no business meddling in trade—it should instead stick 
to its own work).80 Under the constitutionalization school, such coherence 
would be enforced, once and for all, through a system of rules brought outside 
of the political arena. 
Attempts at cooperation, when undertaken without the appropriate spirit of 
independence and contestation reflected in democratic political ethics, can 
result in co-optation, as happened when the WTO Secretariat and the World 
Health Organization co-wrote a study on trade and health.81 The WTO point of 
view, quite narrow in terms of giving play to the value of human health in 
limiting trade liberalization commitments, was more or less simply accepted by 
the World Health Organization, which did not see its own expertise and 
 
 77. Howse & Nicolaïdis,  Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 189. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
81.   See WTO Agreements & Public Health: A Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat,    
WHO   & WTO DOC. VII-2002-6 (2002), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e 
/who_wto_e.pdf.  
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distinctive constituencies as a basis for questioning or challenging the way that 
WTO law was interpreted and applied in health-related matters. If the Bali 
Ministerial leads to robust legal norms and effective results, the WTO’s 
relationships with the major development agencies (including the World Bank) 
and with the World Customs Organization will be crucial in the case of trade 
facilitation, for much of the substance of trade facilitation is more within their 
institutional competences than the current competences of the WTO. The same 
can be said of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, in the case of food 
security. The outlook of the traditional trade-policy elite has been opposed to 
any notion of a real separation of powers, or spirit of contestation between 
branches of governance within the WTO.82 The notion of a member-driven 
organization has been used to attempt to suppress independence of spirit in the 
executive and judicial branches of the WTO, the Secretariat, and the AB 
respectively. In the former case, delegates have pressed for rebuke of 
secretariat officials making progressive-oriented comments on crucial issues of 
trade, human rights, and the environment. In the latter case, delegates 
attempted to intimidate the AB into reversing its decision to allow amicus 
submissions from nongovernmental actors.83 
D. Flexibility: Compromise and Compensation 
Often, in democratic politics, the losers from particular decisions are 
nevertheless able to accept the outcomes as legitimate and consistent with a 
sense of their equal moral value as human beings because this value is 
acknowledged through specific elements of compromise or some form of 
compensation, or both.84 The more WTO negotiation outcomes are 
characterized as “constitutional”—that is, the “right” rules—the less does the 
spirit of compromise and compensation, very typical of the “embedded 
liberalism” of the original GATT, enter into the picture.85 For some developing 
countries, the promise of gains in other areas became a basis, at least ostensibly, 
for accepting rules they did not see as legitimate. By contrast, an approach 
based on compromise and compensation would make the rules themselves 
more legitimate, or at least their costs more bearable. 
Appropriate adjustment to trade liberalization, once a central theme or 
preoccupation, has become peripheral to WTO negotiations.86 Apart from 
 
 82.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 189; Frieder Roessler, 
Are the Judicial Organs of the World Trade Organization Overburdened?, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, 
LEGITIMACY:  THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENIUM 308, 308–28 (Roger B. 
Porter et al., 2001). 
 83.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 190; Robert Howse, 
Membership and its Privileges: The WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy, 9 EUR. L.J. 
496, 497 (2003).  
 84.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 190. See generally 
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLICY 
TRANSITIONS (2014). 
 85.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 190. 
 86.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 190; J. Michael Finger, 
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longer phase-in periods for developing countries in the case of some agreements 
and the very generous “safeguards” that developed countries managed to 
maintain in textiles and agriculture for those concentrated interests, the 
negotiation outcomes of the Uruguay Round displayed little sensitivity to the 
need for mitigation and compensation.87 For example, in the case of intellectual 
property, where the rules were seen by many developing countries as 
illegitimate, there was no effort at compensation or mitigation through covering 
the considerable cost for many developing countries of implementing these 
rules through domestic reforms—the creation of effective domestic 
enforcement mechanisms of intellectual property rights, for example. Concepts 
such as “aid for trade” have acquired some prominence in the current 
negotiations and promise to revive a spirit of compromise and compensation, 
but these ideas are all too easily blocked or watered down by free-trade purists 
who balk at the notion of the WTO becoming an “aid agency.”88 Moreover, aid 
for trade itself can become an instrument simply to enforce, rather than to 
compensate for, outcomes of trade liberalization.89 
But here Bali may mark a new beginning. The structure of the agreement on 
trade facilitation allows for the calibration of developing countries’ 
responsibilities for hard-law obligations to the provision of capacity-building 
assistance; further, the putting in place of such assistance is conceived as an 
integral element in the finalization of the trade facilitation deal, not an 
afterthought.90 The contrast with, for example, TRIPs in the Uruguay Round, is 
evident.91 
Flexibility entails envisaging the multilateral trading system as not only a 
site of fully multilateral bargains to which all members must adhere, but also for 
negotiating open MFN-based plurilateral arrangements among subsets of WTO 
members. This reflects a modification of the rigid constitutionalism toward 
which the system seemed to be veering with the Uruguay Round Single Act and 
the pressure of developing countries on services and TRIPS that led to it. The 
Information Technology Agreement is an early example of such post–Uruguay 
Round flexibility, but the WTO has been slow to take ownership of the 
plurilateral negotiations on green goods that are taking place essentially within 
the institution. Such flexibility, however, desirable as it may be, is in tension 
with the first principle of inclusiveness. The two need to be adjudicated in an ad 
hoc, case-by-case manner through enhanced transparency. And transparency is 
not currently present to say the least, in the Trade in Services Agreement, 
which has been negotiated outside formal WTO procedures almost secretly by  
 
Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements: Problems for Developing Countries, 24 WORLD ECON. 
1097, 1107 (2001). 
 87.  Howse & Nicolaïdis, Democracy without Sovereignty, supra note 1, at 190. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See Antonia Eliason, The Trade Facilitation Agreement: A New Hope for the World Trade 
Organization, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 643, 659–62, 669–70 (2015).  
 91.   Final Act, supra note 20. 
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twenty-four WTO members to supplement the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, which is integral to the WTO.92 
E. Empowerment: Adjustment and Reverse Conditionality 
A permissive interpretation of embedded liberalism must be supplemented 
by a proactive interpretation that lays some responsibility to help states fulfill 
the functions that the original bargain was meant to protect on the global 
community. Clearly, globalization has made it more complicated for some states 
to deliver the goods that citizens have come to expect, or at least for many 
states to recast or redesign the domestic social bargain in order to respond 
effectively to the new pressures and opportunities of globalization.93 Because 
the greatest buffer in cushioning the effects of globalization is at the state level, 
the more open countries are most often the biggest welfare states.94 
In this regard, the spirit of subsidiarity might mean opening the black box of 
states that participate in global governance, a move that might initially seem to 
increase infringement on autonomy. But when framed as empowerment, such 
an opening can be understood as seeking to enhance the life of individuals or 
groups within borders, which in turn reflects the imperative of political equality. 
There is, of course, a fine line between global rules or policies geared at 
empowerment and global rules that dictate the contours of social contracts at 
the national level.  Here again, the WTO can borrow from debates surrounding 
the EU experience, even though the EU itself has a long way to go in this 
regard. Of course, as especially highlighted by the Eurocrisis, this is a highly 
economically integrated economic space where the need for domestic 
adjustment to external economic pressures is especially sharp. This is why the 
EU has indeed been involved in empowerment-type actions, especially in the 
context of the Open Method of Cooperation, implementing the 
recommendations of the Lisbon strategy with regard to growth and 
competitiveness. But here, higher-level intervention has been a double-edged 
sword, empowering certain actors but also disempowering others in the name of 
competition imperatives. In this context, proposals have surfaced to implement 
a European law of unfair regulatory competition.95 Would such an approach be 
appropriate on the global level to curb extreme instances of social or 
environmental dumping or of tax competition? 
More broadly, why not introduce differentiated applicability of such a law 
 
 92.  GATS, supra note 55. 
 93.  See PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION: THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF GOVERNANCE (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that 
globalization does not necessarily diminish the regulatory and redistributive capacities of the state but 
that it does put pressure on the traditional social bargains defining how those capacities are exercised).  
 94.  See generally ROBERT HOWSE, THE WTO SYSTEM: LAW, POLITICS, AND LEGITIMACY (2007). 
See also DANI RODRIK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR? (1997). 
 95.  FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 187 (1999). 
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depending on the level of development or the type of actor? Differentiated 
applicability and opt-outs for very poor or underdeveloped countries will 
ensure that such a regime does not amount to a surreptitious harmonization of 
domestic policies or an imposition of a paradigm of global distributive equity, 
both of which require, to be legitimate, federal democratic governance. 
In other words, the “embedded liberalism” model, whose major function is 
to provide constraints against beggar-thy-neighbor interstate competition, can 
address the “race to the bottom” concern. Some of the poorest countries in the 
world may not accept being so constrained—perhaps quite justifiably—but 
there is little empirical evidence that the importance of such countries in global 
markets is their inducing downward movement of regulatory standards 
elsewhere. On the other hand, a major player in the global marketplace that 
refused to be so constrained would bear a heavy burden of proof that it was not 
simply a free rider. 
Thus, we could envisage a plurilateral code at the WTO on environmental 
and social dumping. Adherence to the code would not be a requirement of 
membership in the WTO. And existing benefits under the WTO system would 
not be conditioned on joining the code. But at least it would provide a 
benchmark for commendable behavior that would dovetail well for instance 
with the new “naming and shaming” approach on the environment agreed to at 
COP 21 in Paris.  Such a code could also link to and balance with the notion of a 
“right to trade,”96 which would give developing countries a right to challenge a 
wide range of domestic policies in developed countries that create obstacles to 
market access, an enhanced version of the GATT idea of “non-violation 
nullification or impairment.”97 When the WTO envisages obligations with real 
financial consequences, it should support state efforts to adjust to those 
obligations. In this respect, as already discussed, the structure of the Bali trade 
facilitation accord is groundbreaking. There is a genuine reverse conditionality: 
developing countries are able to condition their opting in to hard-law 
obligations on obtaining the necessary assistance. This is a promising model for 
new agreements in other areas. For example, if the WTO were to move, as it 
should, to an agreement curbing dirty fuel subsidies, the opting in of poor 
countries could be conditioned on receiving the kind of assistance necessary to 
maintain low-income populations’ access to energy, without giving perverse 
 
 96.  JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & ANDREW CHARLTON, THE RIGHT TO TRADE: A REPORT FOR THE 
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT ON AID FOR TRADE 16 (2012) (“Developing countries should be 
able to bring an action against any advanced country where three conditions are satisfied: A specific 
group of poor people within a developing country (or the country or group of countries as a whole) can 
be identified as being significantly and directly affected by a specific trade or trade-relate[d] policy (or 
policies) of an advanced country[; t]he effect of the policy acts to materially impede the economic 
development of those poor people (or the country or group of countries as a whole); [and] the 
impediment operates by restricting the ability of the people (or the country or group of countries as a 
whole) to trade, or gain the benefits of trade.”).  
97.  GATT art. XXIII ¶ 1(b); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 
2001) (discussing art. XXIII ¶ 1(b) in the context of previous jurisprudence). 
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incentives for the consumption of energy with high carbon externalities. 
 
The role of financial assistance should not be viewed as based on 
conditionality—the imposition of a model of governance on the country 
concerned—but rather, it should be viewed as underpinning the political 
economy of a world trading system still based, for the foreseeable future, on 
mutually beneficial interstate bargains. 
F. Pluralism: Global Deals, Horizontality, and Discretion 
A genuine commitment to the ideal and praxis of pluralism at the global 
level must grapple with the extraordinary diversity prevalent in the WTO’s 
political communities, and in particular, the ways in which common trade rules 
can accommodate divergent moral and religious priorities.98 If pluralism is 
central to mainstream liberal democratic theory á la Ronald Dworkin, its 
import for global governance has been strikingly under-theorized. Under a 
pluralist imperative, “global subsidiarity” requires not only respect for policy 
space to experiment with different approaches to economic governance, but 
also a sensitivity to the fact that some policy instruments may be appropriate or 
inappropriate given particular cultural contexts or commitments. 
Thus, there needs to be a margin of appreciation based not only on the 
ability of WTO members to pursue through their domestic policies certain 
legitimate ends or goals, but also to use means that do not always accord with 
“secular” concepts of instrumental rationality. This relates in significant 
measure to how the general exception provisions of the WTO agreements are 
interpreted, particularly those that relate to “public morals.” The WTO must be 
open to protecting the environment, as well as animal and human health, 
through approaches that are sound under utilitarian policymaking, and are 
shaped by noninstrumental ethical and religious conceptions of what is right. 
Recently, in the EU–Seal Products case,99 the AB gave expression to an 
important degree to the ethos of global pluralism in this sense, accepting that 
the EU ban on seal products could be justified not only in terms of moral 
concern for the suffering of seals, but also as expressing disapprobation of 
complicity with the infliction of such suffering by consumers who purchase the 
products.100 Of course, there are limits to acceptable pluralism in domestic 
democratic communities, set in part by commitments to certain universal rights 
often embedded in constitutions. Analogously, in the global community the 
universalist dimension of human rights, under customary international law, for 
 
 98.  See Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and 
Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values, 37 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 367, 427–31 (2012).  
 99.  Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter EC–
Seal Products]. 
 100.   Id. 
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example, also limits global pluralism. But this is generally not a matter for the 
WTO to adjudicate. 
G. Contestation: Embracing Agonistic Politics 
Democratic governance operates not only through rational discourse of 
justification, important to legitimacy, but also through passionate contestation 
of values and interests. Traditionally, the trade-policy elite has had a 
considerable distaste for such passionate contestation and has sought to achieve 
governance through technocratic, instrumental conceptions, relying on 
“science” or “fact” or artificial boundary-policing devices such as the Product–
Process Distinction that aim to fend off open-ended normative controversy. 
Wisely, the AB has pushed back against this avoidance of normative 
controversy, allowing WTO members to use trade restrictions to pursue their 
own passionately held values in areas of considerable controversy and 
contestation, such as conservation and animal welfare policies—for example, 
Shrimp–Turtle, Tuna–Dolphin II, and Seal Products, all of which are premised 
on rejection of the traditional policing function of the Product–Process 
Distinction.101 
At the level of political and diplomatic institutions, the rejection of agonistic 
politics may be connected (in addition to the general technocratic orientation of 
the insider community) to the fear that passionate controversy will degenerate 
into anarchy and unrest of the kind witnessed in the 1999 Seattle Ministerial 
Conference. Today’s civil society actors are, however, both passionate and 
informed. The identification of passionate agonistic politics with political street 
theater is a crude stereotype. Precisely because the WTO is a close to universal 
institution, with an enormous diversity in its membership, it is an appropriate 
site for passionate contestation of the terms of globalization—much more so 
than regional regimes that are, institutionally, almost invisible, and whose 
insider elites are largely unidentifiable and thus all the more unaccountable and 
unsusceptible to ongoing public scrutiny (although the EU may be the 
exception in this regard). A frequent response when one questions why some 
important topics, such as energy and climate change, are not subject to open 
and extensive discussion in the WTO institutions is that they are “sensitive.” 
The same insiders who give this rationale lament the apparent waning salience 
of the WTO as an institution of global governance. But an institution incapable 
of opening up discussion and negotiation on truly controversial matters will 
eventually and necessarily be marginalized as a norm-creating institution, but 
nonetheless continue to competently manage noncontroversial matters. 
H. Regionalism: Allocation of Power to Intermediaries 
The ethos of subsidiarity has salience not only in its application to the 
 
 101. See generally Appellate Body Report, U.S. Shrimp–Turtle; Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted June 13, 2012); Appellate Body Report, EC–Seal Products. 
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appropriate relationship between the WTO, the levels of governance 
represented by WTO members, and the other international institutions with 
overlapping competences (food, health, environment, human rights), but also to 
regional trade regimes. The traditional insider trade-policy elite has often had a 
schizophrenic attitude toward regionalism. Many have attacked regional 
arrangements and assumed they constitute a zero-sum competition with the 
WTO.102 Often this point of view is criticized as unrealistic and unpragmatic, 
given the great difficulty of negotiating new norms multilaterally. The current 
WTO architecture only addresses whether and under what conditions non-
WTO trade regimes are permissible, not the norms that govern their evolving 
interaction with the WTO.103 Here, for example, there is room for considerable 
innovation.104 There is no point in lamenting the “spaghetti bowl” of regional 
agreements. Instead, regional deals must not exploit asymmetries of power vis-
à-vis the rest of the world, as the EU tends to do when imposing its standards of 
integration (as opposed to, say, consumer protection, which is legitimate) as a 
condition for access to its market. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO CANNOT BE WON BY 
ARCHITECTURAL REFORM BUT INSTEAD DEMANDS A TRANSNATIONAL 
ETHICS OF SUBSIDIARITY 
As we have previously urged, “A genuine spirit of subsidiarity and 
democratic self-determination at the global level calls for the fine-tuning of a 
transnational political ethics for our age of globalization. Such ethics must start 
by speaking to the relationship between the universal and the local, the global 
and the regional.”105 It must and can incorporate other, including minority, 
considerations into decisionmaking and decisionshaping, including agents and 
values from outside one’s circle; committing to returning to past outcomes on 
grounds not only of external change but also internal fallibility; incorporating 
checks and balances in the global management of economic exchange; taking 
seriously the need to empower, or at least to compensate, those who for one 
reason or another are consistent losers in the globalized world; applying the 
principle of mutual recognition to the greatest extent possible when dealing 
with cooperation problems; and finally, translating the demands of pluralism 
into WTO guidelines for adjudication. 
Ultimately, the kind of operational ethics sketched out here could be seen as 
part of a broader philosophy of cosmopolitan pluralism bent on better 
combining the two tenets of responsible interdependence on one hand and 
 
 102.  See generally JAGISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW PREFERENTIAL 
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE (2008).  
 103.  See GATT art. XXVI. 
 104.  See generally, e.g., BERNARD HOEKMAN, SUPPLY CHAINS, MEGA-REGIONALS AND 
MULTILATERALISM: A ROADMAP FOR THE WTO (2014). 
 105.  See Howse & Nicolaïdis, Towards a Global Trade Ethics, supra note 1, at 13.  
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respect for first order differences on the other, including between both cultural 
worlds and socioeconomic bargains. 
 Our intent is both normative and strategic. We challenge elements of the 
hegemonic consensus about trade governance while also recognizing that some 
of these norms are already applied—we are not inventing them as deus ex 
machina; they already affect much behavior and many opinions in the trade 
world. We offer a way to think through the need to adapt the changing global 
order to the claims of emerging powers and the rest of the developing world. 
Although we resist moves from bargaining to constitutionalized rules, we 
nevertheless propose underlying benchmarks for bargaining: mitigate power 
asymmetries and decrease transaction costs. In sum, our vision is not to 
recommend a new legal order but rather to provide a kind of interactive virtual 
code of conduct for all actors in the global trade game. In the spirit of 
subsidiarity, operationalizing such an agenda would be up to those actors 
willing to take part. 
 
